Thursday, June 4, 2020

NcN 2015 CTF - theAnswer Writeup


1. Overview

Is an elf32 static and stripped binary, but the good news is that it was compiled with gcc and it will not have shitty runtimes and libs to fingerprint, just the libc ... and libprhrhead
This binary is writed by Ricardo J Rodrigez

When it's executed, it seems that is computing the flag:


But this process never ends .... let's see what strace say:


There is a thread deadlock, maybe the start point can be looking in IDA the xrefs of 0x403a85
Maybe we can think about an encrypted flag that is not decrypting because of the lock.

This can be solved in two ways:

  • static: understanding the cryptosystem and programming our own decryptor
  • dynamic: fixing the the binary and running it (hard: antidebug, futex, rands ...)


At first sight I thought that dynamic approach were quicker, but it turned more complex than the static approach.


2. Static approach

Crawling the xrefs to the futex, it is possible to locate the main:



With libc/libpthread function fingerprinting or a bit of manual work, we have the symbols, here is the main, where 255 threads are created and joined, when the threads end, the xor key is calculated and it calls the print_flag:



The code of the thread is passed to the libc_pthread_create, IDA recognize this area as data but can be selected as code and function.

This is the thread code decompiled, where we can observe two infinite loops for ptrace detection and preload (although is static) this antidebug/antihook are easy to detect at this point.


we have to observe the important thing, is the key random?? well, with the same seed the random sequence will be the same, then the key is "hidden" in the predictability of the random.

If the threads are not executed on the creation order, the key will be wrong because is xored with the th_id which is the identify of current thread.

The print_key function, do the xor between the key and the flag_cyphertext byte by byte.


And here we have the seed and the first bytes of the cypher-text:



With radare we can convert this to a c variable quickly:


And here is the flag cyphertext:


And with some radare magics, we have the c initialized array:


radare, is full featured :)

With a bit of rand() calibration here is the solution ...



The code:
https://github.com/NocONName/CTF_NcN2k15/blob/master/theAnswer/solution.c





3. The Dynamic Approach

First we have to patch the anti-debugs, on beginning of the thread there is two evident anti-debugs (well anti preload hook and anti ptrace debugging) the infinite loop also makes the anti-debug more evident:



There are also a third anti-debug, a bit more silent, if detects a debugger trough the first available descriptor, and here comes the fucking part, don't crash the execution, the execution continues but the seed is modified a bit, then the decryption key will not be ok.





Ok, the seed is incremented by one, this could be a normal program feature, but this is only triggered if the fileno(open("/","r")) > 3 this is a well known anti-debug, that also can be seen from a traced execution.

Ok, just one byte patch,  seed+=1  to  seed+=0,   (add eax, 1   to add eax, 0)

before:


after:



To patch the two infinite loops, just nop the two bytes of each jmp $-0



Ok, but repairing this binary is harder than building a decryptor, we need to fix more things:

  •  The sleep(randInt(1,3)) of the beginning of the thread to execute the threads in the correct order
  •  Modify the pthread_cond_wait to avoid the futex()
  • We also need to calibrate de rand() to get the key (just patch the sleep and add other rand() before the pthread_create loop
Adding the extra rand() can be done with a patch because from gdb is not possible to make a call rand() in this binary.

With this modifications, the binary will print the key by itself. 

Related links

re: Additional Details

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KPOT Info Stealer Samples


KPOT Stealer is a "stealer" malware that focuses on stealing account information and other data from various software applications and services

References

1.  2020-04-19 Didier Stevens posted analysis of KPOT infostealer on the Infosec Handlers Diary blog "KPOT Analysis: Obtaining the Decrypted KPOT EXE"
These are samples to follow his analysis routine.

2. 2019-05-09 Proofpoint. New KPOT v2.0 stealer brings zero persistence and in-memory features to silently steal credentials


Download

             Other malware




Download. Email me if you need the password (see in my profile)




Hashes

1. From Didier Stevens' post

MD5  56ad7b243511ee7398d43df7643dc904
SHA-1  ae5ab7798ca267b1265a0496c562f219821d17cf
SHA-256  3fd4aa339bdfee23684ff495d884aa842165e61af85fd09411abfd64b9780146

2. From Proofpoint

MD5 7d7667ddce8fd69a0fd50bb08c287d10
SHA-1 087fc3e9a082983ee6a2b25f0ccb09eb723e0f39

SHA-256 67f8302a2fd28d15f62d6d20d748bfe350334e5353cbdef112bd1f8231b5599d

MD5 45ddc687f88b45fc3fec79f9dc8b38e2
SHA-1 de37b748e0e32d96c31f469f9ba4ea4f11e3e78b
SHA-256 36dcd40aee6a42b8733ec3390501502824f570a23640c2c78a788805164f77cecontagio.deependresearch.org/crime/kpotstealer(proofpoint)_win_samp.zip
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re: re: improve serps

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here is the service I was telling you about
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Thu, 04 Jun 2020 01:52:32 -0800 tr, 19:37 02752551494810767030noreply
<02752551494810767030noreply@blogger.com> ra�e:
Ok, send me the link, I need the ranks to be f*ixed urgantly.

Scanning TLS Server Configurations With Burp Suite

In this post, we present our new Burp Suite extension "TLS-Attacker".
Using this extension penetration testers and security researchers can assess the security of TLS server configurations directly from within Burp Suite.
The extension is based on the TLS-Attacker framework and the TLS-Scanner, both of which are developed by the Chair for Network and Data Security.

You can find the latest release of our extension at: https://github.com/RUB-NDS/TLS-Attacker-BurpExtension/releases

TLS-Scanner

Thanks to the seamless integration of the TLS-Scanner into the BurpSuite, the penetration tester only needs to configure a single parameter: the host to be scanned.  After clicking the Scan button, the extension runs the default checks and responds with a report that allows penetration testers to quickly determine potential issues in the server's TLS configuration.  Basic tests check the supported cipher suites and protocol versions.  In addition, several known attacks on TLS are automatically evaluated, including Bleichenbacher's attack, Padding Oracles, and Invalid Curve attacks.

Furthermore, the extension allows fine-tuning for the configuration of the underlying TLS-Scanner.  The two parameters parallelProbes and overallThreads can be used to improve the scan performance (at the cost of increased network load and resource usage).

It is also possible to configure the granularity of the scan using Scan Detail and Danger Level. The level of detail contained in the returned scan report can also be controlled using the Report Detail setting.

Please refer to the GitHub repositories linked above for further details on configuration and usage of TLS-Scanner.

Scan History 

If several hosts are scanned, the Scan History tab keeps track of the preformed scans and is a useful tool when comparing the results of subsequent scans.

Additional functions will follow in later versions

Currently, we are working on integrating an at-a-glance rating mechanism to allow for easily estimating the security of a scanned host's TLS configuration.

This is a combined work of Nurullah Erinola, Nils Engelbertz, David Herring, Juraj Somorovsky, Vladislav Mladenov, and Robert Merget.  The research was supported by the European Commission through the FutureTrust project (grant 700542-Future-Trust-H2020-DS-2015-1).

If you would like to learn more about TLS, Juraj and Robert will give a TLS Training at Ruhrsec on the 27th of May 2019. There are still a few seats left.
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Wednesday, June 3, 2020

ISPY: Exploiting EternalBlue And BlueKeep Vulnerabilities With Metasploit Easier


About ISPY:
   ISPY is a Eternalblue (MS17-010) and BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) scanner and exploiter with Metasploit Framework.

   ISPY was tested on: Kali Linux and Parrot Security OS 4.7.

ISPY's Installation:
   For Arch Linux users, you must install Metasploit Framework and curl first:
pacman -S metasploit curl


   For other Linux distros not Kali Linux or Parrot Security OS. Open your Terminal and enter these commands to install Metasploit Framework:
 

   Then, enter these commands to install ISPY:

How to use ISPY?
 
ISPY's screenshots:

About the author:

Disclaimer: Usage of ispy for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal.
ispy is for security testing purposes only


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CORS Misconfigurations On A Large Scale

Inspired by James Kettle's great OWASP AppSec Europe talk on CORS misconfigurations, we decided to fiddle around with CORS security issues a bit. We were curious how many websites out there are actually vulnerable because of dynamically generated or misconfigured CORS headers.

The issue: CORS misconfiguration

Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) is a technique to punch holes into the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) – on purpose. It enables web servers to explicitly allow cross-site access to a certain resource by returning an Access-Control-Allow-Origin (ACAO) header. Sometimes, the value is even dynamically generated based on user-input such as the Origin header send by the browser. If misconfigured, an unintended website can access the resource. Furthermore, if the Access-Control-Allow-Credentials (ACAC) server header is set, an attacker can potentially leak sensitive information from a logged in user – which is almost as bad as XSS on the actual website. Below is a list of CORS misconfigurations which can potentially be exploited. For more technical details on the issues read the this fine blogpost.

Misconfiguation Description
Developer backdoorInsecure developer/debug origins like JSFiddler CodePen are allowed to access the resource
Origin reflectionThe origin is simply echoed in ACAO header, any site is allowed to access the resource
Null misconfigurationAny site is allowed access by forcing the null origin via a sandboxed iframe
Pre-domain wildcardnotdomain.com is allowed access, which can simply be registered by the attacker
Post-domain wildcarddomain.com.evil.com is allowed access, can be simply be set up by the attacker
Subdomains allowedsub.domain.com allowed access, exploitable if the attacker finds XSS in any subdomain
Non-SSL sites allowedAn HTTP origin is allowed access to a HTTPS resource, allows MitM to break encryption
Invalid CORS headerWrong use of wildcard or multiple origins,not a security problem but should be fixed

The tool: CORStest

Testing for such vulnerabilities can easily be done with curl(1). To support some more options like, for example, parallelization we wrote CORStest, a simple Python based CORS misconfiguration checker. It takes a text file containing a list of domain names or URLs to check for misconfigurations as input and supports some further options:

usage: corstest.py [arguments] infile

positional arguments:
infile File with domain or URL list

optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-c name=value Send cookie with all requests
-p processes multiprocessing (default: 32)
-s always force ssl/tls requests
-q quiet, allow-credentials only
-v produce a more verbose output

CORStest can detect potential vulnerabilities by sending various Origin request headers and checking for the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response. An example for those of the Alexa top 750 websites which allow credentials for CORS requests is given below.

Evaluation with Alexa top 1 Million websites

To evaluate – on a larger scale – how many sites actually have wide-open CORS configurations we did run CORStest on the Alexa top 1 million sites:

$ git clone https://github.com/RUB-NDS/CORStest.git && cd cors/
$ wget -q http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip
$ unzip top-1m.csv.zip
$ awk -F, '{print $2}' top-1m.csv > alexa.txt
$ ./corstest.py alexa.txt

This test took about 14 hours on a decent connection and revealed the following results:

Only 29,514 websites (about 3%) actually supported CORS on their main page (aka. responded with Access-Control-Allow-Origin). Of course, many sites such as Google do only enable CORS headers for certain resources, not directly on their landing page. We could have crawled all websites (including subdomains) and fed the input to CORStest. However, this would have taken a long time and for statistics, our quick & dirty approach should still be fine. Furthermore it must be noted that the test was only performed with GET requests (without any CORS preflight) to the http:// version of websites (with redirects followed). Note that just because a website, for example, reflects the origin header it is not necessarily vulnerable. The context matters; such a configuration can be totally fine for a public sites or API endpoints intended to be accessible by everyone. It can be disastrous for payment sites or social media platforms. Furthermore, to be actually exploitable the Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true (ACAC) header must be set. Therefore we repeated the test, this time limited to sites that return this header (see CORStest -q flag):

$ ./corstest.py -q alexa.txt

This revealed even worse results - almost half of the websites supporting ACAO and ACAC headers contained a CORS misconfigurations that could be exploited directly by a web attacker (developer backdoor, origin reflection, null misconfig, pre-/post-domain wildcard):

The Impact: SOP/SSL bypass on payment and taxpayer sites

Note that not all tested websites actually were exploitable. Some contained only public data and some others - such as Bitbucket - had CORS enabled for their main page but not for subpages containing user data. Manually testing the sites, we found to be vulnerable:
  • A dozen of online banking, bitcoin and other payment sites; one of them allowed us to create a test account so we were able to write proof-of-concept code which could actually have been used to steal money
  • Hundred of online shops/e-commerce sites and a bunch of hotel/flight booking sites
  • Various social networks and misc sites which allow users to log in and communicate
  • One US state's tax filing website (however, this one was exploitable by a MitM only)
We informed all sites we manually tested and found to be vulnerable. A simple exploit code example when logged into a website with CORS origin reflection is given below.


The Reason: Copy & Paste and broken frameworks

We were further interested in reasons for CORS misconfigurations. Particularly we wanted to learn if there is a correlation between applied technology and misconfiguration. Therefore we used WhatWeb to fingerprint the web technologies for all vulnerable sites. CORS is usually enabled either directly in the HTTP server configuration or by the web application/framework. While we could not identify a single major cause for CORS misconfigurations, we found various potential reasons. A majority of dangerous Access-Control-* headers had probably been introduced by developers, others however are based on bugs and bad practices in some products. Insights follow:
  • Various websites return invalid CORS headers; besides wrong use of wildcards such as *.domain.com, ACAO headers which contain multiple origins can often be found; Other examples of invalid - but quite creative - ACAO values we observed are: self, true, false, undefined, None, 0, (null), domain, origin, SAMEORIGIN
  • Rack::Cors, the de facto standard library to enable CORS for Ruby on Rails maps origins '' or origins '*' into reflecting arbitrary origins; this is dangerous, because developers would think that '' allows nothing and '*' behaves according to the spec: mostly harmless because it cannot be used to make to make 'credentialed' requests; this config error leads to origin reflection with ACAC headers on about a hundred of the tested and vulnerable websites
  • A majority of websites which allow a http origin to CORS access a https resource are run on IIS; this seems to be no bug in IIS itself but rather caused by bad advises found on the Internet
  • nginx is the winner when it comes serving websites with origin reflections; again, this is not an issue of nginx but of dangerous configs copied from "Stackoverflow; same problem for Phusion Passenger
  • The null ACAO value may be based on programming languages that simply return null if no value is given (we haven't found any specific framework though); another explanation is that 'CORS in Action', a popular book on CORS, contains various examples with code such as var originWhitelist = ['null', ...], which could be misinterpreted by developers as safe
  • If CORS is enabled in the crVCL PHP Framework, it adds ACAC and ACAO headers for a configured domain. Unfortunatelly, it also introduces a post-domain and pre-subdomain wildcard vulnerability: sub.domain.com.evil.com
  • All sites that are based on "Solo Build It!" (scam?) respond with: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://sbiapps.sitesell.com
  • Some sites have :// or // as fixed ACAO values. How should browsers deal with this? Inconsistent at least! Firefox, Chrome, Safari and Opera allow arbitrary origins while IE and Edge deny all origins.
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